[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1646 : 2025 INSC 533
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr.
v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
(Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 9580 of 2025)
15 April 2025
[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
The High Court rejected the Interim Application No. 11269 of 2024
filed by the petitioner herein u/s.5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and
thereby declined to condone the delay of 301 days in filing the
main appeal u/s.13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
Headnotes†
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 – ss.13(1-A), 16 – Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908 – Order XX Rule 1 – Limitation Act, 1963 –
s.5 – Respondent instituted a civil suit against the Petitioner for
recovery of a sum of money along with interest on the basis of
the award passed by the MSME Council – There was a delay of
301 days in filing the statutory appeal – An application u/s.5 of
the Limitation Act was filed by the Petitioner – The High Court
declined to condone the delay – Before the Supreme Court, the
petitioner contended the pronouncement of the judgment in
the open court in accordance with the amended provisions of
Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point of limitation
unless a free copy of the judgment is provided to the parties
in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1 CPC:
Held: Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be construed as mandatory –
In the present case, after the order in question came to be
pronounced by the Commercial Court, the appellants herein during
the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to why the
said order was not available – It was only eight-months after the
pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the
expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned
upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy – One of
the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act
read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the Commercial
Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay in disposal
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1647
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
of the commercial suit – Once specific time lines are fixed and
there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the Commercial
Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice that they have
to very carefully contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that
failing to comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure,
certain adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of
application by a contesting party – Thus, merely because Order
XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the commercial courts to provide
the copies of the judgment that does not mean that the parties can
shirk away all responsibility of endeavoring to procure the certified
copies thereof in their own capacity – Any such interpretation
would result in frustrating the very fundamental cannons of
law of limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act, 2015 of
ensuring timely disposals – Therefore, this Court is in complete
agreement with the line of reasoning assigned by the High Court.
[Paras 10, 16, 17, 18, 21]
Case Law Cited
Housing Board, Haryana v. Housing Board Colony Welfare
Association and Others [1995] Supp. 3 SCR 219 : (1995) 5
SCC 672; Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper Assam Polywood
Products Private Limited and Others [2020] 9 SCR 472 : (2021)
2 SCC 317 – held inapplicable.
List of Acts
Commercial Courts Act, 2015; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908;
Limitation Act, 1963.
List of Keywords
Condonation of Delay; Period of Limitation; Order XX Rule 1;
Commercial Courts; Limitation period; Free copy of judgment;
Avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial Courts Act.
Case Arising From
EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave
Petition (Civil) No. 9580 of 2025
From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2025 of the High Court
of Jharkhand at Ranchi in COA No. 1 of 2025
1648 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Appearances for Parties
Advs. for the Petitioners:
Sachin Kumar, A.A.G., Saurabh Kripal, Sr. Adv., Kumar Anurag
Singh, Ms. Tulika Mukherjee, Zain A. Khan, Ms. Ekta Bharati.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Order
1. Exemption Application is allowed.
2. This petition arises from the judgment and order passed by the High
court of Jharkhand at Ranchi dated 14.02.2025 in Commercial Appeal
No. 1 of 2025 by which the High Court rejected the Interim Application
No. 11269 of 2024 filed by the petitioner herein under Section 5 of
the Limitation Act, 1963 and thereby declined to condone the delay
of 301 days in filing the main appeal under Section 13(1-A) of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 for short, the “Act, 2015”.
3. It appears from the materials on record that the respondent herein M/s.
Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, a Central Government Company,
instituted a civil suit against the petitioners herein for recovery of
Rs. 26,59,34,854/- with interest at the rate of 15.75 per cent per
annum calculated quarterly till realization from 12.11.2014 on the
basis of the award passed by the MSME Council Kanpur.
4. In filing the statutory appeal, there was a delay of 301 days as
noted above. In such circumstances, the petitioners herein prayed
for condonation of delay. The High Court declined to condone the
delay on the ground that no sufficient cause was assigned by the
petitioners for the purpose of condonation of delay.
5. Mr. Saurabh Kripal, the learned Senior counsel along with Mr. Zain A.
Khan, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners put forward
before us two submissions for our consideration:
(i) According to him the High Court committed a serious error in
dismissing the commercial appeal on the ground of limitation
without considering the true purport of the provisions of Order
XX Rule 1 CPC inserted specially for the commercial courts.
(ii) The High Court failed to take into consideration an important
question of law that the pronouncement of the judgment in
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1649
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
the open court in accordance with the amended provisions of
Order XX Rule 1 CPC cannot be the starting point of limitation
unless a free copy of the judgment is provided to the parties
in the manner provided under Order XX Rule 1 CPC. In other
words, according to the learned counsel, Order XX Rule 1 CPC
should be construed as mandatory and not directory in so far
as providing a copy of the order.
6. In support of the aforesaid two submissions, Mr. Kripal placed
reliance on two judgments of this Court (i) Housing Board, Haryana
v. Housing Board Colony Welfare Association and Others reported
in (1995) 5 SCC 672 and (ii) Sagufa Ahmed and Others. v. Upper
Assam Polywood Products Private Limited and Others reported in
(2021) 2 SCC 317.
7. Before we proceed to consider the two submissions canvassed
on behalf of the petitioners as noted above, we must look into few
provisions of the Act, 2015:
(i) The objective of Commercial Courts, Commercial Division and
Commercial Appellate Division of High Courts Act, 2015 (the
Principal Act) was speedy resolution of commercial disputes.
The “Commercial disputes” have been defined with an inclusive
definition and it covers almost all disputes arising out of the
commercial activities. The Act provides for a Schedule which
amends certain provisions of CPC. These provisions are
applicable to Commercial Disputes of Specified Value. The Act
has clarified that the provisions of the CPC as amended by
the Act would have an overriding effect over any rules of the
High Court, or the amendments to the CPC made by a State
Government.
(ii) Section 16 of the Act, 2015 reads thus:
“16. Amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
in its application to commercial disputes.—(1) The
provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) shall, in their application to any suit in respect
of a commercial dispute of a Specified Value, stand
amended in the manner as specified in the Schedule.
(2) The Commercial Division and Commercial Court
shall follow the provisions of the Code of Civil
1650 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), as amended by this
Act, in the trial of a suit in respect of a commercial
dispute of a Specified Value. (3) Where any provision
of any Rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any
amendment to the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5
of 1908), by the State Government is in conflict with
the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
(5 of 1908), as amended by this Act, the provisions
of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by this
Act shall prevail.”
(iii) Section 13 of the Act, 2015 provides for appeals. The same
reads thus:
“13. Appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions.—(1) Any person aggrieved
by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court
below the level of a District Judge may appeal to
the Commercial Appellate Court within a period of
sixty days from the date of judgment or order. (1A)
Any person aggrieved by the judgment or order of
a Commercial Court at the level of District Judge
exercising original civil jurisdiction or, as the case
may be, Commercial Division of a High Court may
appeal to the Commercial Appellate Division of that
High Court within a period of sixty days from the date
of the judgment or order:
Provided that an appeal shall lie from such orders
passed by a Commercial Division or a Commercial
Court that are specifically enumerated under Order
XLIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of
1908) as amended by this Act and section 37 of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)
(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other
law for the time being in force or Letters Patent of
a High Court, no appeal shall lie from any order or
decree of a Commercial Division or Commercial Court
otherwise than in accordance with the provisions of
this Act.”
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1651
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
8. We must now look into Order XX Rule 1 of the CPC:
“1. Judgment when pronounced.—
(1) The Court, after the case has been heard, shall
pronounce judgment in an open Court, either at once, or
as soon thereafter as may be practicable and when the
judgment is to be pronounced on some future day, the
Court shall fix a day for that purpose, of which due notice
shall be given to the parties or their pleaders:
Provided that where the judgment is not pronounced at
once, every endeavour shall be made by the Court to
pronounce the judgment within thirty days from the date
on which the hearing of the case was concluded but,
where it is not practicable so to do on the ground of the
exceptional and extraordinary circumstances of the case,
the Court shall fix a future day for the pronouncement of
the judgment, and such day shall not ordinarily be a day
beyond sixty days from the date on which the hearing of
the case was concluded, and due notice of the day so
fixed shall be given to the parties or their pleaders.
(1) The Commercial Court, Commercial Division, or
Commercial Appellate Division, as the case may be,
shall, within ninety days of the conclusion of arguments,
pronounce judgment and copies thereof shall be issued
to all the parties to the dispute through electronic mail or
otherwise.
(2) Where a written judgment is to be pronounced, it shall
be sufficient if the findings of the Court on each issue
and the final order passed in the case are read out and
it shall not be necessary for the Court to read out the
whole judgment.
(3) The judgment may be pronounced by dictation in
open Court to a shorthand writer if the Judge is specially
empowered by the High Court in this behalf: Provided that,
where the judgment is pronounced by dictation in open
Court, the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall,
after making such correction therein as may be necessary,
1652 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
be signed by the judge, bear the date on which it was
pronounced, and form a part of the record.”
9. We need to interpret the expression “pronounced judgment and
copies thereof shall be issued to all the parties to the dispute
through electronic material or otherwise”. The argument canvassed
on behalf of the petitioners is that the aforesaid expression should
be construed as mandatory and not directory. In other words, the
argument is that the period of limitation would start only after the
copy of the judgment is provided to the party concerned through any
one of the modes as provided in law.
10. We are afraid it is difficult for us to take the view that the provision
referred to above is mandatory. It comes to this that till the Registry
does not provide the copy of the judgment, though not demanded,
the period of limitation would not commence from the date of the
pronouncement of the judgment.
11. Placing reliance on the decision of Housing Board, Haryana (supra)
it has been contended by the appellants herein that where the rules
themselves enjoin a duty of communicating any order or judgment
that has been passed by a court or forum, then in such cases, the
period of limitation prescribed has to be computed from the date of
such communication.
12. In Housing Board, Haryana (supra), the facts germane for our
consideration are that three appeals were filed before the State
consumer commission by the appellants therein. The State consumer
commission dismissed all the three appeals on the ground that
those were barred by limitation. In appeal before this court, the
appellant therein contended that the delay in filing those appeals
was on account of the non-availability of the certified copy of the
decision rendered by the District Forum which was sought to be
challenged. The appellant therein contended that as per Rule 4(10)
of the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 all orders of the
District Forum are required to be signed and communicated to the
parties free of charge. However, since the order in question after
being pronounced could not be signed due to non-availability of the
President of the District Forum the certified copy of the order could
not be provided in time. In such circumstances, this Court held that
the period of limitation would begin to run only from the date on
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1653
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
which the copies of the order were made available. The relevant
observations read as under: -
“13. In the present case as laid before the State
Commission the appellant contended that the order was
pronounced by the District Forum in the open court on
22-10-1992, it was not signed and dated as the President
had proceeded on leave soon thereafter and therefore,
neither the reasons on which the said order was based
were known nor a copy thereof was furnished to the
appellant-Board so as to know the reasons and contents
of the order. It was also the case of the appellant that
on an enquiry by the counsel for the appellant-Board
he was informed by the stenographer of the President
that the order would be dictated and typed after the
return of the President and that the copy would be
made available to the parties only on 30-10-1992 under
the signature of the President and the copy was in fact
made available to the counsel for the appellant only on
3-11-1992. It may be pointed out that Shri Tirath Singh,
learned counsel appearing for the appellant-Board before
the National Commission had filed his own affidavit
affirming these facts which have not been controverted
by the respondents. On the contrary the reply filed in
this Court by Shri K.C. Chug, President, Housing Board
Colony Welfare Association, Kurukshetra on behalf of
the respondents has admitted that “in the present case
free copies were ready with the office on 30-10-1992
which were collected by the counsel for the answering
respondent on 30-10-1992 whereas the counsel for the
petitioner got the same on 3-11-1992”. From these facts
it is abundantly clear that the copies were duly signed
and dated by the members of the forum on 30-10-1992.
That being so the period of limitation in view of the above
discussion will commence from the date on which the
copies of the order were ready and made available i.e.
30-10-1992. In the present case the appeals were filed
before the State Commission on 30-11-1992 and since
29-11-1992 was Sunday, the appeals were prima facie
within time. In these facts and circumstances there was
1654 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
no question of making any application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeals as there was no delay at all.”
13. Although in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) this Court had held that
where the provisions enjoin a duty of communicating any order or
judgment that has been pronounced, the limitation for challenging
the same would begin from the date of such communication, yet the
aforesaid observations cannot be construed devoid of the context
in which they were made. A close reading of the decision would
indicate that in the said case, after the pronouncement of the order,
the appellants therein had made active efforts for procuring the
said order, and this is evident from the fact that few days after the
pronouncement, the counsel of the appellants therein had made
inquires as regards the unavailability of the order in response to
which he was informed that the order was yet to be signed.
14. Thus, when this Court in Housing Board, Haryana (supra) held
that the limitation for challenging the same would begin from the
date of such communication, the same would be applicable only
where despite best of efforts at the end of the parties in procuring
the order the same could not be obtained and thereby resulting in
unavoidable delay in the filing of appeals. One of the core tenets of
the law of limitation is to enthuse diligence amongst parties as to
their rights. The law of limitation cannot be read in such a manner
whereby parties stop showing any modicum of regard for their own
rights and on the pre-text of untimely communication continue to
litigate without being vigilante themselves.
15. Similarly, we find that the reliance by the appellants on the decision of
Sagufa Ahmed (supra) is also misplaced. In the said case, this Court
while considering Section 421 sub-section (3) of the Companies Act,
2013 held that the period of limitation prescribed therein would start
running only from the date on which a copy of the order is made
available to the person aggrieved. However, yet again in the said
case, the appellants therein had made some efforts to procure a
certified copy of the order to be assailed during the period of limitation.
16. In the present case we find that after the order in question came
to be pronounced by the Commercial Court, Ranchi, the appellants
herein during the limitation period did not bother to even inquire as to
why the said order was not available. It was only eight-months after
the pronouncement of the said order and almost 150-days after the
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1655
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
expiry of the limitation period, that the realization suddenly dawned
upon the appellants herein to apply for the certified copy.
17. One of the avowed objects of the provisions of the Commercial
Courts Act read with amended provisions of CPC applicable to the
Commercial Courts is to ensure that there is no unnecessary delay
in disposal of the commercial suit. Once specific time lines are fixed
and there is a strict procedure provided in terms of the Commercial
Courts Act, parties are by the statute put to notice that they have
to very carefully contest the suits filed as commercial suits and that
failing to comply with statutory timelines and a strict procedure, certain
adverse consequences may flow on account of lack of application
by a contesting party.
18. Thus, merely because Order XX Rule I enjoins a duty upon the
commercial courts to provide the copies of the judgment that does not
mean that the parties can shirk away all responsibility of endeavoring
to procure the certified copies thereof in their own capacity. Any
such interpretation would result in frustrating the very fundamental
cannons of law of limitation and the salutary purpose of the Act,
2015 of ensuring timely disposals.
19. At this stage, we must look into some of the relevant findings recorded
by the High Court. The High Court, in para 18 of its judgment, framed
the following question for its consideration. Para 18 reads thus:
“18. The question for consideration is:
“whether the applicants herein can plead that the
period of limitation for filing the appeal to Commercial
Appellate Division of this Court did not commence at
all because the certified copy of the judgment had
not been issued to the applicants by the Commercial
Courts?””
20. The High Court, thereafter, proceeded to answer the aforesaid
question as under:
“19. In order to answer this question, we cannot lose sight
of the whole purpose of enactment of the Commercial
Courts Act, 2015 i.e., to provide for speedy disposal of
high value commercial dispute.
1656 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
20. No doubt there was a similar provision in Haryana
Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 framed under the
Consumer Protection Act, 1986 which was considered
by the Supreme Court in the case of Housing Board,
Haryana (1 supra).
The said provision in the Haryana Consumer Protection
Rules, 1988 also provided for communication of the order
of the District forum to the parties free of charge in order
to avoid the delay as well as to save the parties from the
burden of expenses that may he incurred for obtaining
the certified copy.
The Supreme Court held that the scheme of the Consumer
Protection Act was to provide for better protection of the
interest of the consumers as a measure for economical
and speedy remedy for the settlement of the dispute and
the matters connected therewith and therefore, the said
rule should be understood in a manner so that it would
protect the interest of the parties before the District forum
by making it obligatory on the District forum to provide a
copy of the order duly signed and dated by the members
of the Bench; and the period of limitation prescribed with
regard to filing of an appeal under Section 15 of the said
Act therefore, has to be computed as commencing from
the date of communication of the order in the manner laid
down in the rules.
It was in that context that it was Held that mere
pronouncement of an order in the open Conn would not
be enough, but under the scheme of the rules copy of
the said judgment has to be communicated to the parties
affected by the said order so that the parties adversely
affected therefrom may have a fair and reasonable
opportunity of knowing the text, reasons and contents
thereof so as to formulate grounds of attack before the
appellate or before the higher forums. In absence of such
communication of signed and dated order, it was held that
the parties adversely affected by it will have no means
of knowing the contents of the order so to challenge the
same and get it set aside by the appellate authority or by
the higher forums.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1657
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
21. Normally petitioners before the District forums under
the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 are individuals and
not corporate entities like the appellant/instrumentality of
the State. So, there is justification for taking the view as
regards petitioners in District forums that the provisions
in the Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988 which
mandated communication of the order of the said forums
to the parties free of charge was to save the parties from
the burden of expenses that may be incurred for obtaining
the certified copy.
22. We are afraid that the logic behind the provision
contained in Haryana Consumer Protection Rules, 1988
framed under the Consumer Protection Act. 1986 cannot
be applied to the litigants before the Commercial Court.
For Commercial entities and in particular litigants like
the applicants herein who are the State Government
Undertakings, the expenses of obtaining a certified copy
of a judgment of the Commercial Court would be very
small compared to the stakes involves in the litigation.
23. Therefore, they cannot be put on the same footing as
a petitioner before the District Consumer forum; and the
logic of counting the period of limitation from the date of
communication of the order of consumer forum, cannot
be applied to a Commercial dispute to which Commercial
entities are parties.
24. In our opinion. Order XX Rule 1 CPC as amended and
made applicable to the Commercial Courts is to be treated
as only directory and not mandatory. So notwithstanding
the provision contained in the amended Order XX Rule 1
CPC (mandating issuance of copies to the parties to the
dispute through electronic mail or otherwise), if such copies
are not issued within a reasonable time, the parties to the
dispute have to apply for the same, and after obtaining
it, prefer an appeal within the time prescribed in Section
13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. This is because the speedy resolution of high value
commercial dispute cannot be lost sight of. Such an
interpretation would be in tune with the scheme and object
1658 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
of the Commercial Couns Act, 2015 and any interpretation
of the nature advanced by the counsel for the applicants
would defeat the whole purpose of the object of the
Commercial Courts Act. 2015 to provide for speedy disposal
of high value commercial disputes.
26. Therefore, we reject the contention of the counsel for the
applicants that the period of limitation for filing the appeal to
the Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court would
not commence unless the judgment of the Commercial
Court in the Commercial suit was communicated by the
said Commercial Court to the parties.
27. We shall next consider whether the delay of 301 days
in filing this Commercial Appeal can be condone in exercise
of power conferred on this Court under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963.
28. The extent of applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation
Act, 1963 to cases falling under the Commercial Courts
Act, 2015 fell for consideration of the Supreme Court in
Government of Maharashtra (2 supra).
29. The Supreme Court in Para 19 of it’s judgment in
Government of Maharashtra (2 supra) discussed the
statement of objects and reasons behind enacting of the
Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and held that period of
limitation must always to some extent be arbitrary and
may result in some hardship, but this is no reason as to
why they should not be strictly followed.
In para 32, it held that the condonation of delay under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has to be seen in the
context of the object of speedy resolution of the dispute.
In para 58, the Supreme Court held that given the object
sought to be achieved under the Commercial Courts Act,
2015 i.e., the speedy resolution of the disputes, expression
“sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963
is not elastic enough to cover long delays beyond the
period provided by the appeal provision itself; and that the
expression “sufficient cause” is not itself a loose panacea
for the ill of pressing negligent and stale claims.
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1659
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
In other words, the Supreme Court indicated that in exercise
of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 a
delay beyond the period of 60 days from the date on
which the appeal could have been filed can be condoned
(i.e., below 120 days from the date of pronouncement of
the judgment) by invoking Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963, but where there is negligence, inaction or lack of
bona fides, such power ought not to be exercised.
It went further in para 59 by observing that merely because
the Government is involved, a different yardstick for
condonation of delay cannot be laid down. (This rule would
thus apply equally to instrumentalities of Government like
the applicants herein).
It held in para 62 that merely because sufficient cause
has been made out in the facts of a given case, there is
no right in the applicants or the appellants to have the
delay condoned.
It concluded in para 63 as under:
“63. Given the aforesaid and the object of speedy disposal
sought to be achieved both under the Arbitration An and
the Commercial Courts Act, for appeals pled under section
37 of the Arbitration Act that are governed by Articles
116 and 117 of the Limitation Act or Section 13(l-A)of
the Commercial Courts Act, a delay beyond 90 days,
30 days or 60 days. respectively, is to be condoned by
way of exception and not by way of rule. In a fit case in
which a party has otherwise acted bona fide and not in
a negligent manner, a short delay beyond such period
can, in the discretion of the court, he condoned, always
bearing in mind that the other side of the picture is that
the opposite party may have acquired both in equity and
justice, what may now be lost by the first party’s inaction,
negligence or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
30. Thus, the Supreme Court in Government of Maharashtra
(2 supra) permitted condonation of delay beyond 60 days
1660 [2025] 4 S.C.R.
Supreme Court Reports
in a case falling under the Commercial Courts Act only by
way of exception and not by way of rule. If the applicants
for condonation of delay had not acted bona fide and had
acted in a negligent manner as in the instant case, the
delay is not liable to be condoned.
31. In the instant case, the delay in filing the appeal is
301 days – way beyond 60 days + 60 days = 120 days
permitted by the judgment of the Supreme Court to be
condoned in exercise of power under Section 5 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. Therefore, such inordinate delay
caused by negligence of the applicants is not liable to be
condoned.
32. We may also point out that the applicants were
represented before the Commercial Court, Ranchi by
counsel and the judgment was obviously pronounced in
the presence of the counsel.
Though the order was pronounced on 09.10.2023 it
appears that the application for issuance of certified
copy was made on 30.08.2024, it was made ready on
07.09.2024, and the appeal was filed on 04.10.2024.
If the Commercial Court had not communicated the copy
of its judgment to the applicants within the reasonable
time, it was incumbent on the part of the counsel for the
applicants or the employees in the Legal Department
of the applicants to apply for issuance of certified copy
from the Commercial Court, but they have failed in their
duty to apply for it when they did not receive it within a
reasonable time.
Their negligence resulted in the inordinate delay of 301
days in filing this appeal.
33. The applicants cannot blame the respondent for not
communicating to them about the disposal of the appeal
and for not making any demand of payment in terms of
the decree of the Commercial Court.
34. They also cannot take advantage of the negligence of
the counsel engaged by them in not informing the applicants
[2025] 4 S.C.R. 1661
Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam Ltd. & Anr. v.
M/s Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited
about the judgment of the Commercial Court. This is
because the applicants have a Legal Department and
employees engaged by the applicants in that department
have a duty to monitor what is happening in the cases to
which the applicants are parties, keep track of the progress
of the said cases and the decisions therein, and ensure
that applications for issuance of certified copy are made to
the concerned court so that the appeals, if required, can be
preferred within the period of limitation prescribed by law.”
21. We are in complete agreement with the line of reasoning assigned
by the High Court.
22. In the result, this petition fails and is hereby dismissed.
23. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Result of the case: Petition dismissed.
†
Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan