A PATTAM KHADER KHAN
v.
PATTAM SARDAR KHAN AND ANR.
JULY 9, 1996.
B [MADAN MOHAN PUNCHHI AND SU.TATA V. MANOHAR, JJ.]
Limitation Act, 196J-Article 13~"Sale becomes final''-Afeaning
of-Whether limitation st01ts numing from the date of confinnation of sale
or from the date of issuance of sale ce1tificate-Code of Civil of Procedure,
C 1908-0rder 21 Rules 92, 94 and 95 and Section 65.
Respondent No. 2 filed a partition suit in which a house was put on
auction as it could not be partitioned. The Respondent No. 1 purchased
the house in auction sale. There was no objection to the sale and the
conduct thereof and the sale was confirmed by the Court on 7.8.1984. A
D sale certificate was, however, issued in favour of Respondent No. 1 on
9.11.1989 i.e. about five years after the sale in favour of Respondent No. 1
was confirmed.
On 9.11.1989, an application under Order 21 Rule 95 of Code of Civil
E Procerlure was moved by Respondent No. 1 seeking delivery of possession
of the auctioned house. The appellant raised objection to the petition on
the ground that the application was barred by limitation under Article 134
of the Limitation Act, 1963 as it was filed more than one year after the
confirmation of sale in favour of respondent No. 1. Article 134 of the
Limitation Act deals with delivery of possession to a purchaser of immov·
F able property at a sale in execution of a decree and provides for a period
of limitation of one year from the date when sale becomes final.
The Trial Court sustained the objection of the appellant. Respondent
No. 1 thereafter filed a revision petition before the High Court. The High
G Court, relying upon the judgment of the Privy Council in Chandra Mani
Saha and Ors. v. A1101jan Bibi & Ors., AIR (1934) PC 134, held that the
period of limitation would start running only after the sale certificate is
issued to the auction • purchaser as the sale becomes final only on issuance
of such certificate. Therefore, the application of the Respondent No. 1 for
delivery of possession was found to be within limitation by the High Court.
H Hence the present appeal.
320
PATIAMKHADER KHANv. PATTAMSARDARKHAN[PUNCHHJ,J.] 321
Allowing the appeal and relegating respondent No. 1 to the remedy A
of a suit for delivery of possession, this Court
HELD : 1 The High Court erred in holding that it is only from the
date when a sale certificate is issued, that the limitation starts running.
[327-F-G]
B
2.1. The title of the Court auction-purchaser becomes complete on
the confirmation of the sale under Order 21. Rule 92, and by virtue of the
thrust of Section 65 CPC, the property vests in the purchaser from the
date of sale. The sale certificate is a formal acknowledgement of a fact
already accomplished, stating as to what stood sold. Such act of the Court
is pristinely a n1inisterial one and not judicial. It is in the nature of a
c
formalisation of the obvious. [327-D]
2.2. A Court sale is a compulsory sale, conducted by or under orders
of the Court. The title to the property sold does not vest in the purchaser
hnmediately on the sale thereof unlike in the case of a private sale. The D
la\\' requires that it does not become absolute until sometime after the sale.
In that W'hile, the sale is susceptible of being set aside at the instance of
the judgment-debtor on the ground of irregularity in publication or con-
duct of the sale or on defalcation as regards deposit of money etc., as
envisaged in Rules 89 and 90 of Order 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
'Where no such application is made the Court is required to make an order,
E
confirming the sale it is upon such confirmation that the sale becomes
absolute in terms of Order 21 Rule 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure. After
the sale has become absolute, a certificate is rec1uired to be granted by the
Court to the purchaser, termed as 'certificate of sale' in Order 21 Rule 94
of the Code of Civil Procedure. Such certificate bears the dates as on which F
the sale became absolute. It is on the sale becoming absolute that the
property sold vests in the purchaser. The vesting of the property is thus
made to relate back to Hie date of sale as required under Section 65 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. [326-D-F]
2.3. Order 21 Rule 95 providing for the procedure for the delivery of G
property in occupation of the judgment-debtor requires an application
being made by the purchaser for delivery of possession of property in
respect of which a certificate has been granted under Rule 94 of Order 21
of Code of Civil Procedure. There in nothing in Rule 9·5 to make it
incumbent for the purchaser to file the certificate along with the applica- H
;
322 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A tion. It is manifest therefore, that the issue of a sale certificate is not "sine
qua non" of the application, since both the matters are with the same
Court. [326-G-H, 327-B]
Chandra Mani Saha v. Allmjall Bibi & Ors., AIR (1934) PC 134 and
Kamakshi Ammal & Anr. v. Amkhani Anunal & Am:, AIR (1957) Mad 440,
B explained.
Rama Klishna Rao v. Challayama, AIR (1953) SC 425; Ganpat Singh
(Dead) by LRs. v. Kai/ash Shankar & 01J., [1987] 3 SCC 146 and Babula/
v. Annapumabai, AIR (1953) Nagpur 215, referred to.
c CIVIL APPELLATE .JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4171 of
1995.
From the .Judgment and Order dated 29.11.93 of the Andhra Pradesh
High Court in c;:.R.P. No. 880 of 1991.
D D. Prakash Reddy, R. Santhana Krishnan, D. Mahesh Babu, for K.R.
Nagaraja for the Appellant.
S. Markandeya for Ms. Chitra Markandeya for the Respondents.
The Judgment of the Court was delivered by
E
PUNCHHI, J. Pattam Rasool, the second respondent herein, filed a
suit before the Civil Court for partition and separate possession, claiming
one sixth share in a residential house in the town of Nellore in the State
of Andhra Pradesh. Pattam Khader Khan, the appellant herein, was one
F of the defendants therein. On January 7, 1977, a preliminary decree was
passed by the court in his favour. Thereafter, the plaintiff/second respon-
dent. made an application for appointment of an Advocate Commissioner
for effect partition, which was allo\ve<l. The Commissioner becoming seisin
of the matter, reported to the trial court that the house was not partible
and resort be had to a sale thereof so that the sale proceeds can be
G apportioned amongst the co-sharers. A public auction was thus on permis-
sion conducted by the Commissioner, whereby the sale was knocked down
in favour of the first respondent, Pattam Sardar Khan; no other than the
son of the plaintiff, at a price of Rs. 17,000. No objection of any sort from
any quarter was raised against the sale or the conduct thereof. The sale
H was thus confirmed by the court on 7.8.1984. A sale certificate was issued
PArJAM KHADER KHANv. PATI'AMSARDARKHAN [P\JNCHHI.J.] 323
in favour of the auction~purchaser about five and quarter years later on A
9.J 1.1989. The matter in this way stood finalised.
Having obtained the sale certificate, an application under Order 21
Rule 95 read with Section 151 of.the Civil Procedure Code was moved by
the auction-purchaser first respondent on 9.11.1989, seeking delivery of
possession of the auctioned house. An objection was raised thereto by the
B
appellant stating that since the application of the first respondent was
barred by the limitation prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act,
1963, no order for delivery of possession could be given_ in favour of the
first respondent. The executing court of the District Munsif, Ncllore, on
14,12,1990 sustained and objection regarding the bar' for limitation, which c
made the first respondent move the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at
Hyderabad in revision. The High Court on 29.11.1993 allowed the revision
petition, of the first respondent, holding that he was entitled to take
possession of the house purchased. Hence this appeal by the objector.
D
The fate of this appeal depends on the way in which the High Court
has understood and applied the decision of the Privy Council in Chandra
Mani Saha and 01". v. Anaijan Bibi and 01~., AIR (1934) Privy Council
134. The High Court has gathered therefrom that the period of limitation
for filing an application by the auction purchaser, for delivery of possession
of the property purchased, does not start until the matter stands concluded E
finally against the judgment-debtor, as well as until the sale certificate is
issued to the auction-purchaser, after the dismissal of all objections in the
appellate stages, and that the limitation under Article 180 (now, Article
134 in the limitation Act) would run from the date of the issuance of the
sale certificate. But, the High Court has, in our vie\v committed an error p
in reading the Privy Council decision in that manner, as \vould presently
be seen.
It is evident from the aforementioned Pri;y Council case that there
\Vere l\VO n1ortgage decrees and lO\Vards execution both the properties
covered therein were sold, which were purchased by the appellants therein. G
The objections raised thereto under Order 21 Rule 92(1) CPC were
dismissed by the executing Court on April 15, 1924. The sales were con-
firmed by the executing court on April 22, 1924. The appeals against orders
dated 15.4.1924, disallowing objections, were preferred before the High
Court on July 21, 1924. The High Court dismissed the appeals on March H
324 _SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A 17, 1927. Sales certificates were issued by the executing Court on May 19,
1928 and June 6, 1928 respectively. Applications for delive;y of possession
under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC were made by the appellants therein on
September 10, 1928. The applications were within the prescribed period of
limitation if computed from the date of the issuance of sale certificates, but
B beyond the prescribed period of limitation computed from the date when
the sales were confirmed.
Order 21 Rule 92(1) provides that where no application is made
under Rule 89, Rule 90 or Rule 91, or where such application is made and
disallowed, the Court shall make an order confirming the sale and there
C the sale shall become absolute. In strict conformity therewith the sales in
the P1ivy Council's case became absolute on April 22, 1924. All the same
the judgment-debtors therein had a right of appeal under Order 43 Rule
l against the orders of the executing Court dated April 15, 1924, rejecting
their applications lo set aside the sales. On the availing of such right, the
High Court re··examined the matter and dismissed the appeal, confirming
D the orders of the executing Court, making the sales effective and absolute.
On this premise, the Privy Council expressed itself in the following words:
"Upon consideration of the Sections and orders of the Code,
their Lordships are of opinion that in construing the meaning of
E the words "when the sale becomes absolute" in Article 180, Limita-
tion Act, regard must be had not only to the provisions of Order
21 Rule 92(1) of the schedule to the Civil Procedure Code, but
also to the other material sections and orders of the Code, includ-
ing those which relate to appeals from order made under Order
21, Rule 92(1). The result is that where there is an appeal from an
F order of the Subordin~le Judge, disallowing the application to set
aside the sale, the sale will not become absolute within the meaning
of Article 180, Limitation Act, until the disposal of the appeal,
even though the Subordinate .Judge may have confirmed the sale,
as he was bound to do, when he decided to disallow the abovc-
G mentloned application.11
And further :
"Their Lordships therefore are of opinion that on the facts of
this case the sales did nol become absolute within the meaning of
H Article 180, Limitation Act, until 17th March, 1927, and that the
PA'ITAMKHADERKl-IANv. PATIAMSARDARKHAN[PUNCHHJ,J.] 325
applications for possession of the properties purchased at the A
auction sales were not barred by the Limitation Acl."
To recall, March 17, 1927, the day from which the period of limitation was
viewed to start, was the day when the appeals were dismissed by the High
Court and not the day on which the sale certificates were issued by the B
executing Court. The High Court in instant case thus missed the point. The
Privy Council had nowhere ruled that the period of limitation under Article
180 would run from the date of issuance of the sale certificates. The High
Court was therefore in error.
The view of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Kamak- C
slzi Ammal and Anr. v. Amkkani Ammal and Anr., AIR 1957 Madras 440,
following the Privy Council decision, had also taken the view it has taken,
as also in some other cases. Far from il. Rather the Madras High Court
had clearly opined that even though the third Column of Article 180 of the
Limitation Act, 1908 refers to the date of commencement of the period of D
limitation as the date when the sale becomes absolute, that clause must be
read not only with the provisions of Order 21 Rule 92(1) CPC, but also
with the other material sections and orders of the Court as had been
a?thoritatively enunciated by their Lordships of the Privy Council in
Chandra Mani Saha & O"·· v. Anmjan Bibi & 01,-., AIR (1934) Privy
Council 134. E
This Court in Rama Krishna Rao v. Clzal/ayanuna, AIR (1953) SC
425, has also followed and approved Chandra Mani Saha's case of the Privy
Council, ruling as follows :
F
"Where a Subordinate Judge has disallowed an application
under Order 21, Rule 90, to set aside a sale in execution, and has
made an order under rule 92(1) confirming the sale, and an appeal
from disallowance has been dismissed by the High Court, the three
years' period provided by the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, G
Schedule I, Article 180, for an application under Order 21, Rule
95, by the purchaser for delivery of possession runs from the date
of the order on appeal, the High Court having under the Code of
Civil Procedure, 1908, the same powers as the Subordinate Judge,
the 'time when the sale becomes absolute', for the purpose of
Article 180 is when the High Court disposes of the appeal." H
326 SUPREME COURT REPORTS {1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A And hence, not from the date of issuance of the sale certificate,
despite the suggestive language of Order 21 Rule 95. Thus, where there is
no application to set aside a sale, as in the instant case, the order of
confirmation of sale in itself is the final. step in making the sale absolute
and the matter is thus put to rest.
B
This Court again in Ganpat Singh (Dead) by L1:r. v. Kai/ash Slwnkar
& 013·., [19871 3 sec 146 has noticed the state of law as laid down in
Cha11dra Ma11i Saha's case, and as followed by the Madras High Court in
Kamakshi Ammal's case. The matter in that regard thus stands crystallised.
There is no stray though! to the contrary in any of the decisions of various
c High Courts cited on behalf of the appellant before us.
Now to the spirit of it. A Court sale is a compulsory sale, conducted
by or under orders of the Court. The title to the property sold docs not
vest in the purchaser immediately on the sale thereof unlike in the case of
D a private sale. The law requires that it does not become absolute until
sometime requires that it does not become absolute until sometime after
the sale; a period of at least 30 days must expire from the date of sale
before the sale can become absolute. In that while, the sale is susceptible
of being set aside at the instance of the judgment-debtor on the ground of
irregularity in publication or conduct of the sale or on defalction as regards
E deposit of money etc, as envisaged in Rules 89 and 90 of Order 21. Where
no such application is made, as is the case here, the Court was required,
as indeed it did, to make an order, confirming the sale and it is upon such
confirmation that the sale becon1es, and becan1e, absolute in tcr111s of
Orders 21 Rule 92. After the sale had become absolute, a certificate is
F required to be granted by the Court to the purchaser, termed as 'certificate
of sale' in Order 21 Rule N. Such certificate bears the date as on which
the sale became absolute. It is on the sale becoming absolute that the
property sold vests in the purchaser. The vesting of the property is thus
made to relate back to the <late of sale as required under Section 65 CPC.
G Order 21 Rule 95 providing for the procedure for delivery of proper-
ty in occupation of the judgment-debtor etc, requires an application being
made by the purchaser for delivery of possession of property in respect of
which a certificate has been granted under Rule 94 of Order 21. There is
nothing in Rule 95 to make it incumbent for the purchaser to file the
H certificate alone with the application. On the sale becoming absolute, it is
PATIAMKHADERKHAN v. PATIAMSARDARKHAN [PUNCHHl.J.J 327
obligatory on the Court though; to issue the certificate. Thal may, for any A
reason, get delayed. Whether there be failure to issue the certificate or
delay of action on behalf of the Court or the inaction of the purchaser in
completing the legal requirements and formalities, are factors which have
no bearing on the limitation prescribed for the application under Article
134. The purchaser cannot seek to extent the limitation on the ground that
B
the certificate has not been issued. It is true though that order for delivery
of possession cannot be passed unless sale certificate stands issued. It is
manifest therefore that the issue of a sale certificate is not nsine qua nonn
of the application, since both these matters arc with the same Court. The
starting point of limitation for the application being the date when the sale
becomes absolute i.e. the date on which title passed, the evidence of title, c
in the form of sale certificate, due from the Court, could always be supplied
later to the Court to satisfy the requirements of Order 21 Rule 95. See in
this regard Babula/ v. Annapwnabai, AIR (1953) Nagpur 215, which is a
pointer. It therefore becomes clear that the title of the Court auction-pur-
chaser becomes complete on the confirmation of the sale under Order 21, D
Rule 92, and by virtue of the thrust of Section 65 CPC, the property vests
in the purchaser from the date of sale; the certificate of sale, by itself, not
creating any title but merely evidence thereof. The sale certificate rather
is a formal acknowledgement of a fact already accomplished, stating as to
what stood sold. Such act of the Court is prcstinely a ministerial one not
judicial. It is in the nature of a formalisation of the obvious. E
Such being the state of law on the subject, we fail to see how the
High Court could have come to the conclusion under Order 21 Rule 92
CPC effectively passing title, the same can only be complete when
evidenced by a sale certificate issued under Order 21 Rule 94, and that F
unless the sale certificate is issued, limitation cannot start for the purpose
of an application under Order 21 Rule 95 CPC, vis-a-vis, Article 134 of the
Limitation Act, 1963. The High Court, in our view erred in holding that it
is only from the date when a sale certificate is issued, that the limitation
starts running. Snch view of the High Court would not only cause violence
to the clear provisions of Article 134 of the Limitation Act but have the G
effect of unsettling the law already settled.
There can be a variety of factors conceivable by which delay can be
caused in issuing the sale certificate. The period of one year limitation, now
prescribed under Article 134 of the Limitation Act, 1973, in substitution of H
328 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (1996] SUPP. 3 S.C.R.
A the three years period prescribed under Article 180 of the Indian Limita-
tion Act of 1908, is reflective of the legislative policy of finalising proceed-
ings in execution as quickly as possible by providing a quick forum to the
auction-purchaser to ask delivery of possession of the property purchased
within that period from the date of the sale becoming absolute, rather than
from the date of issuance of the sale certificate. On his failure to avail such
B
quick remedy the law relegates him to the remedy of a suit for possession
in a regular way.
Thus for the aforesaid reasons, we have no hesitation to allow this
appeal, set aside the impugned order of the High Court, restoring that of
C the First Court, which we hereby do, relegating the first respondent to the
remedy of a suit, should he be so advised, but without any order as to costs.
B.K.M. Appeal allowed.