'. S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS MESSRS. KAMARHATTY CO. LTD. v. SHRI USHNATH PAKRASHI (B. P. SINHA, P. B. GAJENDR.AGADK.AR and K. N. w.ANCHOO, JJ.) 473 Industrial Dispute-Power of Tribunal-Order of re-instatement, when can be made-Industrial Disputes Act (I4 of I947), ss. 33A, IO. The respondent made an application under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which, inter alia. stated that there was no reason for retrenchment on account of the closure of a ration shop, and that at any rate he was longer in s.ervice than others who had been retained, and, therefore, the principle of " last come, first go " had been violated. The Tribunal dis- missed the application whereupon the respondent appealed to the Appellate Tribunal which allowed the appeal and refused permis- sion to retrench. The Appellant Company was granted special leave to appeal only on the limited question as to whether an order of re-instate- m~nt can be made on an application under s. 33A of the Act. Held, that the complaint under s. 33A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, is as good as a reference under s. IO of the Act and the Tribunal has all the powers to deal with it as it would have in dealing with a reference under s. 10 of the Act and it is open to the Tribunal in proper case to order re- instatement. Cxvn. APPELL.ATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 310of1954. Appeal by special leave from the judgment and order dated March 22, 1956, of the Labour Appel- late Tribunal of India, Calcutta. in Appeal No. Cal. 183 of 1955. N. 0. Chatterjee, S. N. Mukherjee and B. N. Ghosh, for the appellant. Sukumar Ghosh, for the respondent. 1959. May 21. The Judgment of the Court wa.1 delivered by I959 May u. WANCHOO J.-This appeal by special leave agai11st wanehoo J. the decision of the Labour Appellate Tribunal of India is limited to the question whether an order of reinstate- ment can be made on an application under s. 33-A of 6o 474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [1960(1)] z959 the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter called the Kamarhatty Act). The brief facts necessary for the decision of this co., Ltd. question are these. The appellant is a Jut!J Mill. There v. was a dispute pending before an Industrial Tribunal UshnaJhPakrashi between a number of jute mills in West Bengal and their employees, and the appellant was ·a party to that Wanchoo J. dispute. During the pendency of that dispute, the appellant laid-off the respondent who was an employee in the ration shop maintained by the appellant from July 19, 1954, as rationing of food-stuff came to an end from July IO, 1954. The reason for the lay-off was _that the ration shop was closed following the end of rationing. This resulted in the staff in that shop becoming surplus. Consequently,· nine persons were selected for retrenchment on the principle of "last come first go", and the respondent was one of them. The appellant also applied under s. 33 of the Act to the Industrial Tribunal for permission to retrench the respondent along with others. Shortly before t_he application under s. 33, the respondent had applied under s. 33-A of the Act and his case was that there was no reason to make any retrenchment on account of the closure of the ration shop and that he was at any rate longer in service than others who had been retained and therefore the principle of" last come first go " had not been followed. It was also said that the respondent bad been laid-off as he was an active worker of the union and as such was not in the good books of the appellant. It was, therefore, prayed that the respondent should be allowed full wages and ameni- ties since the so-called lay-off, which was nothing more nor less than retrenchment and that he should be reinstated. The Industrial Tribunal came to the conclusion that the lay-off was justified because of the closure of the ration shop' and gave permission to the appellant to retrench the respondent on the principle of" last come first go". The respondent appealed to the Labour Appellate Tribunal. He did not urge there that there was no ne.cessity for retrenchment at all. What was urged there was that the Industrial Tribunal was wrong in holding that the principle of" last come first S.C.R. SUPREME COURT REPORTS 475 go" had been followed in this case. The Appellate z959 Tribunal came to the conclusion that the respondent had been in service much longer than others who had Kama,hatly b . l f' l Co.,Lld. een retained and therefore the prmcip e o " ast come v. first go" had been violated. In consequence, the usl111ath Pakraslli appeal was allowed and the permission to retrench the respondent was refused. The Appellate Tribunal also Wanchoof. ordered that the respondent should be reinstated in service without any break in the continuity of service and the order of the appellant in laying him off and discharging him in effect from July 19, 1954 was set ai:.ide. Thereupon the appellant came to this Court and was granted special leave on the limited question set out above. In our opinion, the answer to the limited question on which the special leave has heen grantBd can only be one in view of the language of 8. 33.A. That section lays down that. "where an employer contravenes tho provisions of s. 33 during the pendency of proceedings before a tribunal, any employee aggrieved by such contravention, may make a complaint in writing to the tribunal and on receipt of such complaint the tribunal shall adjudicate upon the complaint as if it were a dis- pute referred to or pending before it, in accordance with the provisions of the A<:t and sl111ll submit its awar