2026 INSC 1129SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 1 of 40 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA EXTRA-ORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 25507 OF 2026 THE SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT … PETITIONER(S) VERSUS SAMEER AHAMED N. AND OTHERS ... RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.
1. The controversy in present proceedings though originating in the claim of an individual for a community certificate, travels far beyond the issuance of such certificate.
It concerns the legal consequences of a person's conversion from Hinduism to Islam and, in particular, whether a person belonging to a Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified Community or Scheduled Caste prior to such conversion can, after embracing Islam, claim the status and consequential benefits of a Backward Class Muslim.
2. Respondent No.1 was born on 12.04.1993 in Tuticorin District to Hindu Parents namely Narayanan and Gomathiammal.
He was originally named Paramasivara, son of Narayanan. On 11.09.2015, the Sunnath Jamath, Kayathar issued a certificate recording that respondent no.1 had embraced Islam and had changed his name to Sameer Ahamed. This change of respondent no. 1’s name was thereafter published in the Tamil Nadu SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 2 of 40 Government Gazette on 02.11.2016. Thereafter, respondent no. 1 married Vahitha on 04.11.2016 in accordance with Islamic customs, and two children were born from the said marriage.
Respondent no. 1 claims to profess and follow the faith of Labbai1 Muslims and, on that basis, sought recognition as a “Muslim Labbai”.
3. Subsequently, respondent no. 1 submitted an online application before the Kayathar Taluk Office, Thoothukudi District, seeking issuance of a Backward Class (Muslim) community certificate as “Muslim Labbai”. However, the said application was rejected on 13.11.2020.
The reason recorded for such rejection was that respondent no. 1 had converted from Hinduism to Islam and was seeking a Muslim Labbai certificate, but had “only converted to religion and not to the caste”.
4. Aggrieved by the rejection, respondent no. 1 instituted W.P.(MD) No. 7127 of 2022 before the High Court of Judicature at Madras2 under Article 226 of the Constitution, seeking quashing of the rejection of his application and a consequential direction to the authorities to issue him a community certificate as “Muslim Labbai”.
Notice was issued on 19.04.2022 and the matter was taken up on 16.06.2022.
5. While the writ petition remained pending, the Tamil Nadu Backward Class Commission3, by letter dated 06.02.2024, considered the question of issuance of Backward Class Muslim community certificates to persons belonging to Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes, Denotified 1 Also referred to as ‘Lebbai’ 2 For short, ‘High Court’ 3 For short, ‘TNBCC’ SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 3 of 40 Communities and Scheduled Castes who converted to Islam.
The TNBCC considered the position of persons who were already enjoying reservation benefits in their respective categories before conversion and recommended a mechanism for grant of Backward Class Muslim community certificates to eligible proselyte who embraced any of the recognised Backward Class Muslim communities.
6. Pursuant thereto, the Government of Tamil Nadu issued G.O.(Ms.) No. 314 dated 09.03.2024.
The G.O. referred to 3.5% reservation provided for Backward Class Muslims under the Tamil Nadu Backward Class Muslims (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions including Private Educational Institutions and of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 20075 and the seven Muslim communities recognized as Backward Class Muslims under Section 3(a) of Tamil Nadu Backward Classes, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Reservation of Seats in Educational Institutions and of Appointments or Posts in the Services under the State) Act, 19936.
The G.O. further provided that a proselyte to Islam from Backward Classes, Most Backward Classes and Denotified Communities who were already availing the said reservation could, upon conversion into any of the seven recognised Backward Class Muslim communities, be issued a Backward Class Muslim community certificate.
7. The aforesaid G.O. became material to respondent no. 1's pending writ petition.
Respondent no. 1's counsel submitted before the High Court that it 4 For short, ‘G.O.’ 5 Hereinafter referred as ‘Act 33 of 2007’ 6 Hereinafter referred as ‘Act 45 of 1994’ SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 4 of 40 was only by virtue of the said G.O. that respondent no. 1's claim could be pressed. The High Court, upon examining the G.O., formed a prima facie view regarding its validity and, on 11.06.2026, suo motu impleaded the concerned Secretary of the State Government.
The matter was thereafter taken up on 16.06.2026, 22.06.2026 and 23.06.2026, when the High Court examined the effect of conversion to Islam upon caste or community status and the position of the seven notified Backward Class Muslim communities.
8. Vide judgment dated 25.06.2026, the High Court held that a person who embraces Islam becomes a Muslim and cannot, merely by reason of such conversion, acquire membership of a particular Muslim community recognised as a Backward Class.
It further held that the executive could not, through the G.O., alter the legal position declared in the earlier judicial decisions. The High Court accordingly declared the said G.O. unconstitutional, dismissed the writ petition and sustained the rejection of respondent no. 1's application for the community certificate. It further held that a person who converts to Islam cannot claim the status of Backward Class Muslim and is only a Muslim.
9.
The State has assailed the aforesaid judgment before this Court, inter alia, contending that respondent no. 1's writ petition was directed against the rejection of his individual application and contained no substantive challenge to the constitutional validity of the G.O., nor any prayer seeking its quashing. The State questions the High Court's decision to travel beyond the individual certificate dispute and invalidate the G.O., which had been issued pursuant to the recommendation of the TNBCC and dealt with the entitlement of SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 5 of 40 persons from specified backward categories to reservation benefits upon conversion to Islam.
SUBMISSIONS 10. Shri Mukul Rohatgi and Shri Sidharth Luthra, learned senior counsels appearing for the State of Tamil Nadu submitted that the impugned judgment travels beyond the pleadings and relief sought in the writ petition, inasmuch as the constitutional validity of the G.O. dated 09.03.2024 was never challenged by the writ petitioner. Learned senior counsels would argue that the said G.O. was relied upon by the writ petitioner himself, yet the High Court proceeded to examine and invalidate it with State-wide consequences, without affording an effective opportunity to the State or hearing the persons and authorities likely to be affected thereby.
11.
On merits, the written submissions filed by the State states that the impugned judgment proceeds on a fundamental conflation of two distinct propositions. On one hand, the State does not dispute with the findings of the High Court that mere conversion to Islam cannot, by itself, confer membership of a particular notified Muslim community such as Labbai, Rowther or Deccani Muslim, where such community membership is referable to birth and lineage.
However, on the other hand, the State argues that the G.O. does not purport to confer such community membership upon a convert. Rather, it merely preserves the entitlement to backward-class reservation of a person who already belonged to a notified backward community before conversion. SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 6 of 40 12. It was further submitted that the above distinction is material because the constitutional scheme under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution concerns socially and educationally backward classes, and is not confined to caste-based identities.
The State relied upon the decision of this Court in Indra Sawhney and Others vs. Union of India and Others7 to contend that backward classes may exist across religious communities and that conversion does not, by itself, obliterate the social and educational backwardness which formed the basis of the person's inclusion in the backward class.
13. Learned senior counsels would further submit that the decisions relied upon by the High Court concerning conversion and Scheduled Caste status under Article 341 of the Constitution, operate in a distinct constitutional field and cannot be mechanically applied to the determination of backward-class status under Articles 15(4) and 16(4) of the Constitution.
The State accordingly contended that the impugned judgment erred in treating the consequences applicable to Scheduled Caste status as determinative of the question concerning continuation of backward-class entitlement.
14. Lastly, it was submitted that the G.O. dated 09.03.2024 does not extend any reservation benefit to a person belonging to a forward community merely because such person converts to Islam.
Its operation is confined to persons who were already members of the identified backward communities prior to conversion. Thus, according to the State, the G.O. neither creates a new backward class nor confers membership of a Muslim community by 7 1992 Supp (3) SCC 217 SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 7 of 40 conversion, but only recognises the continuance of an existing backward- class entitlement. ANALYSIS 15.
We have heard the learned senior counsels and have perused the written submissions advanced on behalf of the State and the materials placed on record. We have also carefully considered the challenge founded upon the jurisdiction of the High Court to examine the validity of the said G.O. in proceedings in which the original prayer was confined to the issuance of a community certificate.
16. The challenge before us, however, cannot be determined merely by asking whether the High Court travelled beyond the prayer made in the writ petition preferred by respondent no.
1.
The validity and legal effect of the G.O. have necessarily arisen for consideration because the very right claimed by respondent no. 1 is founded upon it. A perusal of the record of proceedings would project that the High Court, after noticing the G.O., impleaded the State as a party, afforded it an opportunity to place its case, heard the learned Additional Advocate General of the State and proceeded to adjudicate upon the legal foundation of the relief claimed.
The record itself shows that the High Court, on 11.06.2026, took the view that the G.O. might not withstand judicial scrutiny and thereupon impleaded the State.
17. It is true that ordinarily a court should not pronounce upon the validity of an instrument when the parties have not had notice of the challenge and SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 8 of 40 no opportunity to meet it.8 The principle which underlines herein is one of fairness wherein parties must know the case they are required to meet and a court should not ordinarily grant relief on a ground which has neither been pleaded nor put in issue.
But the principle is not a mechanical prohibition upon a Constitutional Court examining an instrument whose validity becomes inseparable from the relief before it. The only question which is crucial herein is whether the affected party had notice of the issue and a meaningful opportunity to address it. As far as the present case is concerned, the State was specifically impleaded after the High Court formed a prima facie view concerning the validity of the G.O.
A counter affidavit was filed and the learned Additional Advocate General of the State appeared and addressed the Court on the very question. The High Court expressly recorded that the proceedings had, by then, reached the stage of final adjudication for the purpose of testing the validity of the G.O.
18. The present case is therefore distinguishable from a case where a Court, without notice, converts an ordinary dispute into a constitutional challenge and determines an issue on which the parties have neither pleaded nor led submissions.
The objection of the State based upon the absence of a formal prayer consequently cannot, in the facts of the present case, prevent examination of the G.O. Indeed, once the State itself defended the validity and operation of the G.O. and relied upon it as the legal basis for respondent no. 1's entitlement, the Court could not be expected to grant relief on the 8 See: Union of India vs. Manjurani Routray, (2023) 9 SCC 144 at Para 10 to 14.
SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 9 of 40 assumption that the very instrument upon which that relief depended was beyond examination.
19. This now brings us to the substance of controversy in the present case. However, before examining the validity and legal effect of the impugned G.O., it would be apposite to notice the religious and social framework within which the controversy has arisen. This is necessary not to enter into matters of theology as an end in themselves, but to appreciate the distinction between religious identity, community affiliation and social status which lies at the heart of the controversy.
The question before us concerns the consequences attributed by the impugned G.O. to a person's conversion to Islam and, in particular, the manner in which such conversion is sought to be connected with membership of a notified Backward Class Muslim community. The answer to that question cannot be divorced from an understanding of the concepts which the impugned G.O. seeks to bring together. We, therefore, consider, at the outset, the relevant religious and social features before turning to the constitutional and legal validity of the course adopted by the State.
A. THEOLOGY OF ISLAM 20. Islam rests, in its foundational theological conception, upon the equality of human beings and does not make birth, lineage or descent the SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 10 of 40 measure of human worth. The Holy Quran articulates this principle in clear terms in Surah Al-Hujurat, Ayah (49:13)9: “O humanity! Indeed, We created you from a male and a female, and made you into peoples and tribes so that you may get to know one another.
Surely the most noble of you in the sight of Allah is the most righteous among you. Allah is truly All-Knowing, All-Aware.” (emphasis supplied) 21. The verse recognises the existence of peoples and tribes, but does not attribute to such distinctions any inherent superiority or inferiority. The criterion of nobility is expressly stated to be righteousness. The distinction, therefore, is between an identity arising from one's birth or lineage and the moral worth attributed to an individual; the former does not, in the conception embodied in the verse, determine the latter.
22.
The same principle finds expression in the Farewell Sermon (Khubat al- Hajjat) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon him), wherein he is recorded to have stated: “All mankind is from Adam and Eve. An Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab, nor does a non-Arab have any superiority over an Arab; a white person has no superiority over a black person, nor does a black person have any superiority over a white person, except by piety and good deeds.
Learn that every Muslim is a brother to every Muslim and that the Muslims constitute one brotherhood.”10 (emphasis supplied) 23. The foundational proposition is thus one of equality notwithstanding differences of race, tribe, lineage or descent. The distinction which Islam 9 Surah Al-Huju Ayah (49:13) https://quran.com/al-hujurat/13 (Also reproduced by High Court at Para 11 of Impugned judgment). 10 Para 11 of the impugned judgment.
SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 11 of 40 recognises is not a hierarchy founded upon birth, but one founded upon piety and conduct.
24. The social organisation of Muslims in India, however, has historically displayed distinctions between different communities and groups. In his 1960 study on Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh, Sociologist Ghaus Ansari, while drawing upon the material contained in the decennial censuses, classified Indian Muslims into three broad categories, Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal.11 The Ashraf were described as the “noble born”, while the Ajlaf and Arzal comprised groups placed lower in the social hierarchy.
These broad categories, however, comprised a plurality of distinct groups and were not themselves homogeneous communities.
25. The subsequent sociological material employs terms such as biradari and zat to describe a member of these groups. The evidence discussed by noted sociologist Imtiaz Ahmad12 in his book titled ‘Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims in India’ indicates that such groups were, in several instances, associated with particular occupations, observed endogamous practices and were constituted on the basis of birth.
Membership in such a group was consequently not ordinarily a matter of individual choice or religious profession. 11 Ghaus Ansari, ‘Muslim Caste in Uttar Pradesh: A Study of Culture Contract’ Chapter 5, Pg. 35-51” (Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society, UP, Lucknow-1960; Also cited in: Ahmad, T. (2023). ‘Politics of Recognition and Caste among Muslims: A Study of Shekhra Biradari of Bihar, India’ CASTE A Global Journal on Social Exclusion, 4(1), Pg. 92–108. 12 Imtiaz Ahmad, ‘Caste and Social Stratification among Muslims in India’ (2nd ed., Manohar Publications, 1978) SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 12 of 40 26.
The distinction between community and caste assumes particular significance in the case of the three-fold classification of Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal. These terms describe broad gradations of social position and encompass numerous distinct communities. Within the Ashraf, for instance, there were different groups associated with identities such as Sayyid, Shaikh, Pathan and Qureshi, while the Ajlaf and Arzal categories likewise comprised different communities with their own occupational, social and local identities.
The broad classification therefore cannot itself be treated as a description of three homogeneous castes.
27. At the same time, the fact that these communities were distinct does not mean that their social organisation was devoid of hierarchical or hereditary features. Among sections of Indian Muslims, membership in particular communities could be substantially hereditary; particular communities could be historically associated with particular occupations; marriage could predominantly take place within the group; and groups could occupy unequal positions in the local social order.
These are features of social stratification which cannot be disregarded merely because the foundational religious doctrine is egalitarian.
28. Nor does the existence of a hereditary occupational association, considered by itself, establish the existence of caste. An occupation followed by successive generations may, over time, become associated with the identity of a community and may continue to influence matrimonial and social relations even after individuals cease to practise that occupation.
Hereditary SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 13 of 40 occupational association is therefore one relevant characteristic, but it cannot be treated as a sufficient test of caste in isolation.
29. The comparison with the classical caste order must also take account of the absence of a single, uniformly applicable religiously prescribed scheme in the social organisation of Indian Muslims. The boundaries and status of Muslim communities have not been uniformly fixed or equally rigid across regions and groups.
Social identities could, in particular circumstances, be asserted, modified or reconfigured, including through processes of social mobility and changes in claims to status and lineage.
30. The possibility of such movement in social status has also been examined in the sociological literature through the concept of ‘Ashrafisation’. The expression ‘Ashrafisation’ as stated by sociologist Imtiaz Ahmad13 denotes a process whereby individuals, families or groups occupying a relatively lower position in the social hierarchy sought to enhance or reconstitute their social standing through the adoption of the customs, manners, titles or genealogical claims associated with the Ashraf (noble class).
The concept illustrates that, notwithstanding the existence of hierarchical distinctions, claims to social status and lineage were not invariably immutable. Social position could, in particular circumstances, be negotiated, asserted or reconstructed. This possibility of upward social movement did not dissolve the underlying hierarchy; rather, it demonstrates that hierarchy and mobility could coexist 13 Imtiaz Ahmad, ‘Is There Caste Among Muslims In India?’ [Part of Thirteenth D.
N. Majumdar Memorial Lecture 2015 delivered under the auspices of the Ethnographic and Folk Culture Society, Lucknow, on 20 March 2015, in the University of Lucknow.] See: http://www.raoinseattle.com/library/17%20Indian%20Law/Ahmad%20I%202015%20Cast e%20among%20Muslims%20in%20India.pdf SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 14 of 40 within the same social order unlike the rigid stratification in the Hindu stratification.
31.
The position that emerges is consequently a nuanced one. Among sections of Indian Muslims, there have existed communities whose organisation displays several characteristics ordinarily associated with caste, including hereditary membership, occupational association, endogamy and graded social status. Such characteristics establish the existence of social stratification and, in particular contexts, caste-like structures.
They do not, however, warrant treating Ashraf, Ajlaf and Arzal as three homogeneous castes constituting a single and uniform system throughout Muslim society in India.
32. The distinction between religious prescription and social practice must therefore be maintained. The Islamic conception reflected in the Quranic verse and the Farewell Sermon of the Prophet, as discussed by us earlier, places the criterion of human worth in righteousness and conduct, and not in race, tribe or lineage.
The social practices that developed among particular Muslim communities in India may depart from, or stand in tension with, that foundational conception. Their existence cannot, however, retrospectively convert a social practice into a theological command; equally, the absence of such a theological prescription cannot be taken to mean that caste-like forms of social stratification did not develop among Indian Muslims.
33.
It is thus possible to recognise both propositions without contradiction. That the egalitarian principle is foundational to Islam, and that Muslim society in India has not been immune from social stratification. The SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 15 of 40 appropriate characterisation is therefore not that Muslim society in India has been wholly untouched by caste, nor that it has reproduced in every respect the classical caste system.
Rather, distinct Muslim communities have, in varying degrees and in different regions, developed forms of hereditary social stratification which may be analogous to caste, while remaining distinct communities whose boundaries and social positions have not been uniformly fixed.
34. The foregoing discussion assumes significance when the effect of conversion upon an existing claim to affirmative action is considered.
The question is not merely whether social disadvantage may be found among persons professing Islam, nor whether a person who has converted from Hinduism may continue to experience the consequences of disadvantages suffered in the past. The anterior question is whether the social circumstances which rendered a person backward in the social order from which he has converted can continue, after conversion, to furnish the basis of a constitutional claim to affirmative action.
This, in turn, requires consideration of the manner in which backwardness is understood for the purposes of Article 16(4) of the Constitution and its relationship with the social structure in which it arises.
35. This Court in, Indra Sawhney (supra), undertook a comprehensive examination of the concept of a “backward class” under Article 16(4), including the relevance of caste, the identification of social classes, and the circumstances in which groups outside the Hindu social order may constitute SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 16 of 40 backward classes.
This Court speaking through BP Jeevan Reddy J. (for MH Kania CJ, MN Venkatachaliah J, AM Ahmadi and himself) observed thus: “796.-797. We may now summarise our discussion under Question No.
3.
(a) A caste can be and quite often is a social class in India. If it is backward socially, it would be a backward class for the purposes of Article 16(4). Among non-Hindus, there are several occupational groups, sects and denominations, which for historical reasons are socially backward.
They too represent backward social collectivities for the purposes of Article 16(4).
(b) Neither the constitution nor the law prescribe the procedure or method of identification of backward classes. Nor is it possible or advisable for the court to lay down any such procedure or method. It must be left to the authority appointed to identify. It can adopt such method/procedure as it thinks convenient and so long as its survey covers the entire populace, no objection can be taken to it.
Identification of the backward classes can certainly be done with reference to castes among, and along with, other groups, classes and sections of people. One can start the process with the castes, wherever they are found, apply the criteria (evolved for determining backwardness) and find out whether it satisfies the criteria. If it does — what emerges is a “backward class of citizens” within the meaning of and for the purposes of Article 16(4).
Similar process can be adopted in the case of other occupational groups, communities and classes, so as to cover the entire populace. The central idea and overall objective should be to consider all available groups, sections and classes in society. Since caste represents an existing, identifiable social group/class encompassing an overwhelming majority of the country's population, one can well begin with it and then go to other groups, sections and classes.
(c) It is not necessary for a class to be designated as a backward class that it is situated similarly to the Scheduled Castes/Scheduled Tribes.
(d) ‘Creamy layer’ can be, and must be, excluded.
(e) It is not correct to say that the backward class contemplated by Article 16(4) is limited to the socially and educationally backward classes referred to in Article 15(4) and Article 340.
It is much wider. The test or requirement of social and educational backwardness cannot be applied to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, who indubitably fall within the expression “backward class of citizens”. The accent in Article 16(4) appears to be on social backwardness. Of course, social, educational and economic backwardness are closely intertwined in the Indian context. The classes contemplated by Article 16(4) may be wider than those contemplated by Article 15(4).” (emphasis supplied) SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 17 of 40 36.
The aforesaid exposition also explains the significance of the proposition in Indra Sawhney (supra) that caste cannot, by itself, be the sole criterion for identifying a backward class. The proposition does not proceed on the assumption that caste is merely one factor amongst several unrelated considerations. In the Hindu social order, caste has historically constituted the principal basis upon which social status and the attendant disabilities have been organised and perpetuated.
The requirement that other relevant circumstances must also be taken into account serves a different purpose. Mere membership of a caste cannot be treated as conclusive proof that every individual belonging to it continues to suffer the social backwardness which Article 16(4) of the Constitution seeks to address. A person belonging to a caste historically regarded as backward may, by reason of education, occupation, economic/social advancement or an elevation in social standing, have ceased to suffer the disabilities which constitute the basis of affirmative action.
It is for this reason that the identification of a backward class cannot rest upon caste alone, and that the other circumstances bearing upon the continuance of social backwardness must also be examined. The exclusion of the creamy layer is itself an illustration of this principle. The enquiry is thus directed towards identifying those who continue to suffer the relevant social disability and not towards treating caste membership as an immutable or conclusive constitutional status for affirmative action.
37.
There is, however, a distinct question which did not arise for consideration in Indra Sawhney (supra). That decision considered the manner in which backward classes may be identified, including among non- SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 18 of 40 Hindus, and recognised that occupational groups, sects and denominations among non-Hindus may, for historical reasons, constitute backward classes under Article 16(4).
It did not consider the effect of a change of religion upon an existing claim to affirmative action founded upon the social backwardness within the Hindu social order. The question before us is therefore not whether persons professing a religion other than Hinduism can constitute a backward class. They plainly may, where the constitutional requirements are independently satisfied. The question is whether social backwardness arising within one social order or religion can continue to furnish the same constitutional entitlement upon a person's entry into another social order or religion.
38.
The answer must necessarily have regard to the source of the social backwardness in question. In the Hindu social order, caste has been the foundational institution through which social hierarchy, birth-based status, hereditary occupation, social intercourse and access to social and educational opportunities have historically been structured. The several manifestations of social backwardness may therefore present themselves in different forms such as occupational, educational, economic or otherwise.
But, apart from the euphemism by which such manifestations may be described, their historical and social foundation, where the backwardness in question is caste-based, lies in the caste order itself. The fact that Indra Sawhney (supra) requires considerations other than caste to be taken into account does not permit this foundational fact to be disregarded. SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 19 of 40 39. It is in this context that the effect of conversion falls to be considered.
Where a person was entitled to affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution by reason of the social backwardness within the Hindu social order, such entitlement is founded upon the disabilities which arose within, and were produced by, that social structure. Upon conversion to Islam or Christianity, or to any other non-Hindu social order in which caste is not recognised as the basis of social status and classification, that foundational basis ceases to operate in the same manner.
The fact that the consequences of the earlier disability may continue in the form of educational deprivation, occupational disadvantage, economic hardship or other material circumstances cannot carry the antecedent social backwardness into the new religion. To permit such continuation would be to detach the consequences from the social structure which produced them and to transpose social backwardness of one religion into another religion in which such backwardness is not recognised as the basis of social classification.
The constitutional benefit cannot be made to travel in this manner from the religion in which the relevant backwardness arose to a religion whose basic theological structure or otherwise does not recognise caste as its foundational basis.
40. The constitutional treatment of caste-based disadvantage furnishes further indication of the same principle. Paragraph 3 of the Constitution (Scheduled Castes) Order, 1950, as originally made under Article 341 of the Constitution, restricted the Scheduled Caste status to persons professing the Hindu religion, the subsequent constitutional amendments extended the SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 20 of 40 position to Sikhs and Buddhists, while persons professing Islam or Christianity remain outside its scope.
The provision operates specifically in the field of Scheduled Caste status and cannot, by itself, determine every question arising under Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It nevertheless reflects the constitutional understanding that the status attached to caste- based disability is not wholly detached from the social and religious order within which that disability is constitutionally recognised. But a caste identity cannot be treated as an immutable personal attribute carrying with it, irrespective of a change in religious affiliation, every constitutional protection or benefit which was available on account of that identity and the social backwardness attaching to it.
41.
Consequently, where a person was receiving affirmative action under Article 16(4) of the Constitution in the Hindu social order, upon conversion to Islam, Christianity or to any other non-Hindu social order brings such entitlement norms to an end. B. VALIDITY OF G.O. DATED 09.03.2024 42. The distinction between religion and community assumes particular significance in the present case. The fact that a person professes Islam does not, by that circumstance alone, identify the particular Muslim community to which he belongs.
Muslim social organisation in India has historically comprised a number of distinct groups, whose identities have, in different regions and contexts, been associated with descent, occupation, locality, ethnicity, customary affiliation and patterns of social association. The material placed before us also indicates that the communities with which the SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 21 of 40 present controversy is concerned have had distinct social histories and identities; the Labbai, Rowther and Marakkayar, for instance, have been separately described in the literature on the social organisation of Tamil Muslims, even though they fall within the statutory entry relating to Labbais in the State's Backward Class list.
The seven categories like Dekkani Muslims, Dudekula, Labbais including Rowthar and Marakayar, Mapilla, Sheik, Syed and Ansar are likewise not a single undifferentiated category of Muslims, but specifically identified communities within the State's scheme of backward- class classification. It is against this distinction between religious identity and membership of a particular notified community that the impugned G.O. must now be examined, for the question is not merely what follows from a person's conversion to Islam, but whether such conversion can, in law, furnish the basis for treating him as a member of a particular notified Backward Class Muslim community and extending to him the reservation attached to that class.
43.
The fundamental premise of G.O. dated 09.03.2024 is that a person belonging, before conversion, to a Backward Class, Most Backward Class, Denotified Community or Scheduled Caste, who thereafter embraces Islam, may be treated as a Backward Class Muslim and may be issued a community certificate under one of the seven Muslim communities notified by the State for which the State has reserved 3.5% of seats and posts for Backward Class Muslims under Tamil Nadu Act 33 of 2007.
44.
The distinction which lies at the heart of the matter is between continuance of a disadvantage and acquisition of membership of a particular SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 22 of 40 backward class. The proposition does not follow that conversion by itself makes that person a member of a particular Muslim community already notified as a backward class. The impugned G.O. proceeds from precisely such a conflation.
Respondent no. 1 was not seeking merely recognition of the fact that he had become a Muslim, rather a certificate was sought specifically one certifying him as a Muslim Labbai. This distinction is material as the certificate of conversion issued by the Sunnath Jamath, Kayathar, recorded that respondent no. 1 had embraced Islam and changed his name, however it did not itself establish that he was born into or had historically belonged to the Muslim Labbai community.
The record shows that his application for a Muslim Labbai certificate was rejected on the ground that respondent no. 1 converted to a religion and not to a caste or community.
45. Before the High Court, the State sought to answer this difficulty by submitting that the seven communities are already notified as Backward Class Muslims and that the G.O. merely preserves the reservation benefit which the proselyte enjoyed before conversion.
But this explanation does not answer the anterior question as to what is the legal basis upon which a person who was not a member of one of those Muslim communities before conversion becomes a member of that community after conversion. The answer to this cannot be found in the fact of conversion itself as conversion establishes religious affiliation and it does not, establish membership of a particular socio-historical community within that religion.
To reflect on this distinction, we feel it imperative to place reliance on the observations made by the High Court in G. Michael vs. S. Venkateswaran, Additional Secretary to SLP (C) No.25507/2026 Page 23 of 40 Government, Public (Elections) Department14 which had been approved by this Court in Kailash Sonkar vs. Maya Devi15 and C. Selvarani vs. Special Secretary-cum-District Collector and Others16.
The High Court in G. Michael (supra) had held that a Hindu converting to Islam ceased to belong to his original caste and became a Muslim, and that his position in Muslim society was not determined by the caste to which he had belonged before conversion. The relevant observation made by the High Court are reproduced hereinbelow: “Christianity and Islam are religions prevalent not only in India but also in other countries in the world.
We know that in other countries these religions do not recognise a system of castes as an integral part of their creed or tenets. Is it different in India? Mr. Venkatasubramania Aiyar frankly confessed that so far as Islam is concerned there is no question that it does not tolerate any difference based on caste distinction. A member of one of the castes or sub- castes when he is converted to Islam ceases to be a member of any caste.
He becomes just a Mussalman and his place in Muslim society is not determined by the caste to which he belonged before his conversion. Learned Counsel also conceded that generally this is so even when there has been a conversion to Christianity. But he said that there were several cases in which a member of one of the lower castes who has been converted to Christianity has continued not only to consider himself as still being a member of the caste, but has also been considered so by other members of the caste who had not been converted.
I am prepared to accept that instances can be found in which in spite of conversion, the caste distinctions might continue. This is somewhat analogous to cases in which even after conversion certain families and groups continue to be governed by the law by which they were governed before they became converts. But these are all cases of exception and the general rule is conversion operates as an expulsion from the caste; in other words, a convert ceases to have any caste.” (emphasis supplied) 46.
We are in agreement with the above proposition laid down in G. Michael (supra) that upon conversion f