2026 INSC 784Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 1 of 77 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No (s). OF 2026 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026) DR. LOKESH B.H. & ORS. …APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S) J U D G M E N T SANJAY KAROL, J. For ease of reference, the judgment is divided as follows: Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 2 of 77 Table of Contents PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS ........................................................ 3 SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL ............................ 5 RELEVANT PROVISIONS .......................................................... 11 OUR CONSIDERATION............................................................. 16 STRICT INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES .................... 16 MISCHIEF RULE AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION ............. 23 CONCEPT, OBJECT, IMPORT AND MISUSE OF SECTION 498A IPC ........................................................................................... 31 RELATIONSHIP IN THE NATURE OF MARRIAGE: UNDERSTANDING THE CONCEPT ........................................... 42 WHETHER PROTECTION UNDER THE DV ACT SUFFICES? .... 48 PROTECTION OF LAW DEPENDS ON A CHOICE? .................... 55 HARMONISING WORDS AND INTENT ...................................... 63 RELEVANT SAFEGUARDS ....................................................... 72 PRESENT FACTS...................................................................... 75 CONCLUSION .......................................................................... 76 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 3 of 77 1. Leave Granted.
2. These appeals present a pertinent question as to whether a man who is in a live-in relationship can be prosecuted under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 18601. This question arises at the instance of the appellant, Dr. Lokesh B.H., whose petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 to quash the proceedings initiated by respondent no.2, (Smt.
Theertha) being CC No. 28129 of 2023 and CC No. 630 of 2019 was rejected by the High Court of Karnataka at Bengaluru, in terms of common judgment and order dated 18th November, 2025, in Criminal Petition Nos. 8134 of 2024 and 9412 of 2021. PREVIOUS PROCEEDINGS 3. The allegations are that the accused-appellant and respondent no. 2 were married as per Hindu customs and rituals on 17th October 2010 and since then were residing in Bengaluru.
Come 2016, however, the marriage of the parties hit rocky waters leading up to the present appeal. A perusal of the record reveals that the dispute inter partes led to the filing of two complaints by respondent no.2, being Crime No. 383 of 2016 and Crime No. 450 of 2016. The former culminated in a charge-sheet 3 being filed before the III Additional Civil Judge (Junior Division) and JMFC, 1 IPC 2 CrPC 3 CC No. 630 of 2019 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 4 of 77 Shivamogga District, under Section 498A IPC. The latter resulted in charge-sheet4 under Sections 498A, 504, 506, 307,494 and 149 of the IPC, along with Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 5 before the XXIV Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bengaluru.
4. To begin with, the difference between the parties rests at a fundamental point, whether or not they were married.
The accused-appellant contends that they were not married at all and as such no question arises regarding the application of Section 498A. Respondent No. 2, on the other hand, submits that they had been in a valid subsisting marriage and, therefore, all the Sections in which the appellant has been charged are actually maintainable. The High Court rejected the contentions of the appellant that a valid marriage is a sine qua non for the application of Section 498A IPC, as an unduly technical construction of the provision that is removed from the purpose and intent thereof.
It was observed that the appellant had suppressed the factum of his first marriage, and that after marrying respondent no.2, presented himself as her husband. The relevant extract of the High Court’s reasoning is as under: “13.9. The term “husband” in Section 498A must be given a purposive and expansive construction, and the protection afforded by the provision cannot be denied merely on the technical ground of a void marriage.
Where a man induces a woman to believe that she is lawfully married to him, and thereafter subjects her to cruelty, such a man cannot be 4 CC No. 28129 of 2023 5 DPA Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 5 of 77 permitted to evade criminal responsibility on the plea that no valid marriage existed in law.
13.10. The facts, as they stand, clearly show that the Petitioner and Respondent No.2 lived together in a relationship having all the trappings of a marital union.
They cohabited, represented themselves as husband and wife, and performed domestic and social obligations typically associated with marriage. The relationship thus falls squarely within what has been recognised in recent times as a“relationship in the nature of marriage”, or colloquially known as a “Live-In” relationship, attracting the protective umbrella of Section 498A, provided the factual allegations satisfy the elements of “cruelty” as defined in the explanation to the section. … 13.14.
In the result, I hold that the expression “husband” in Section 498A IPC is not confined to a man in a legally valid marriage, but extends to one who enters into a marital relationship which is void or voidable, as also to a live-in relationship which bears the attributes of marriage, so long as the essential ingredients of cruelty as defined in the explanation to the section are satisfied.” (emphasis supplied) SUBMISSIONS OF THE LEARNED COUNSEL 5.
Mr. Anand Sanjay M. Nuli, learned senior counsel, appeared for the appellant, Mr. Brijender Chahar, learned Additional Solicitor General, appeared for the State of Karnataka. Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, appeared for respondent no.2. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General, and Ms. Nina R Nariman, learned counsel, assisted the Court as amicus curiae. 5.1 Mr. Nuli, submits that Section 498A of IPC, being a penal provision, has to be construed strictly to include only a husband i.e., a man in a valid and lawful marriage – not a Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 6 of 77 void one. Awarding such an interpretation to the Section does not render the woman remedy-less, as a number of other provisions of the IPC and the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 6 would apply. In furtherance of the submission, reliance is placed on Shivcharan Lal Verma vs. State of Madhya Pradesh7 where the Court had set aside a conviction under Section 498A since the marriage in question was null and void; in U.
Suvetha vs. State8 it was observed that for a person to be included within the term “husband”, he would have to have contracted a valid marriage and then subjected the wife to cruelty; paragraph 7 thereof, culled out the ingredients of the offence and one of them is that the woman must be married; in Aluri Venkata Ramana vs. Aluri Thirupathi Rao9 - herein, the objective of the Section was discussed as being the protection for married women from cruelty at the hands of their husbands and in-laws.
This was held to be inclusive of acts of harassment or coercion of the woman or her family into not only fulfilling demands for property or valuable security, including dowry, but otherwise also. In other words, it served a broader objective to safeguard such women. 6 DV Act 7 (2007) 15 SCC 369 8 (2009) 6 SCC 757 9 2024 SCC Online 5473 Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 7 of 77 5.2 The Union of India supported the case of the appellant.
It was submitted that the parliamentary debates regarding the DV Act specifically recorded that prior to this Act, all other remedies available to women, including Section 498A IPC, specifically cater to married women. Further, that under the variety of legislations, both religiously specific and secular laws governing marriage, the recognition for marriage is between a biological male and a biological female.
Living together for however long does not constitute marriage within the understanding of the statutory regime. Reference is made to P. Sivakumar vs. State represented by DSP10; Noor Jahan vs. State11; D Velusamy vs. D. Patchaiammal12; U. Suvetha supra; K.V. Prakash Babu vs . State of Karnataka13; Prathiba Tyagi vs. Kamlesh Devi14. Further, with reference to Indra Sarma vs. VKV Sarma15; Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav vs.
Anantrao Shivram Adhav 16 ; Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat 17 ; Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse 18 . The meaning of the word “wife” has been expounded to say that all live-in relationships are not relationships in the nature of marriage and the recognition of such relationships within the meaning of the DV Act were 10 Cr. Appeal No. 1404 of 2023 of the Supreme Court of India 11 (2008) 11 SCC 55 12 (2010) 10 SCC 469 13 (2017) 11 SCC 176 14 (2022) 8 SCC 90 15 (2013) 15 SCC 755 16 (1988) 1 SCC 530 17 (2005) 3 SCC 636 18 (2014) 1 SCC 188 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 8 of 77 for civil remedial purposes; a second marriage which is obviously void does not confer status of wife on the second woman, even under Section 125 Cr.PC. “wife” means a legally wedded wife. If the law suffers from any inadequacy, the same is only within the scope of the Parliament to remedy. 5.3 Ms. Hetu Arora Sethi, submits that the word “husband” has to be given a purposive construction, and the Section must be applied also to void/voidable marriages.
In essence, the reasoning of the High Court is adopted. Relying on Reema Aggarwal vs. Anupam19 and A.Subash Babu vs. State of A.P.20, it is submitted that Section 498A would be maintainable in a case where the second wife is not legally wedded but has been induced into a second marriage and subjected to cruelty. If the appellants’ submission is accepted, it would amount to a wrongdoer taking advantage of his own wrong.
At the stage of quashing when a prima facie case of cruelty is made out, such proceedings should not be interfered with. 5.4 The State of Karnataka supports the position of respondent no.2 and prays for dismissal of the appeal. 5.5 Ms. Nariman, by way of detailed submissions, has supported the application of Section 498A to live-in- relationships that qualify as “relationships in the nature of marriage”.
In doing so, she has vehemently argued for 19 (2004) 3 SCC 199 20 (2011) 7 SCC 616 Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 9 of 77 purposive interpretation of legislation carrying socially reformative objectives. (See: Koppisettti Subbharao vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 21 ; Chief Justice of A.P. vs. L.V.A. Dixitulu22; Kehar Singh vs. State (Delhi Admn.)23; Badshah supra; Rupali Devi vs.
State of Uttar Pradesh24; X vs. State (NCT of Delhi)25. Further, the interpretation of Section 498A of IPC must be in accordance with Articles 14, 15(3) and 21 of the Constitution of India. In Hiral P. Harsora & Ors. vs. Kusum Narotmdas Harsora26 Section 2(Q) of the DV Act, which restricted the meaning of the word “relative” to an adult male, was struck down as the distinction between a male and a female relative did not bear any rational nexus to the objective of the DV Act.
Similarly, it is argued that a male “in the nature of the husband” cannot be excluded from the word “husband” within the Section, for doing so shall not be a reasonable classification. K.S. Puttaswamy vs. Union of India 27 recognized ‘privacy’ as an intrinsic facet of Article 21, which includes the ability of an individual to make choices that lie at the core of their personality. This, it is argued, would include the right to marry or not; as also the choice to enter into relationships in the nature of marriage.
By adopting a restrictive interpretation of the word “husband”, the effect 21 (2009) 12 SCC 331 22 (1979) 2 SCC 34 23 (1988) 3 SCC 609 24 (2019) 5 SCC 384 25 (2023) 9 SCC 433 26 (2016) 10 SCC 165 27 (2017)10 SCC 1 Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 10 of 77 would be that perpetrators of domestic violence would fall through the cracks. Reliance is placed on observations in Reema Aggarwal supra, more particularly para 11 and 18 thereof, wherein it has been observed that strict interpretation of the term “husband” and “wife” is warranted in cases of civil rights, Right to Property etc., but a liberal approach cannot be questioned against its application if the intent is curbing a social evil.
Reema Aggarwal supra has been affirmed by a three-Judge Bench - Rajinder Singh vs. State of Punjab28. It is submitted that reading of all these judgments, including Shiv Charan Lal Verma supra, would reveal that Section 498A will not apply in a case where a woman knowingly enters into a relationship with a married man. However, if the woman was not aware of the previous relationship and her relationship with the said married man carries the trappings of a marriage, then the same would apply.
In connection with Section 304B, Rajinder Singh supra is once again referred to and the same has been directed to be construed liberally in view of its socially beneficent objective. The interpretation given by this Court to the phrase “relationship in the nature of the marriage” as under the DV Act is instructive in the present case for interpreting the word “husband”. In the context of Section 125 also, it is submitted that although initially a restrictive 28 (2015) 6 SCC 477 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 11 of 77 view was taken, the same has been subsequently whittled down- See: Kamala vs. M R Mohan Kumar29. RELEVANT PROVISIONS The Indian Penal Code, 1860 304B. Dowry death.— (1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this sub-section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961). (2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life. 498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means— (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. (emphasis supplied) 29 (2019) 11 SCC 491 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 12 of 77 Cr.P.C.
125. Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.- (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain – (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself, or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate minor child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself, or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury, unable to maintain itself, or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct : Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a minor female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such minor female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means: Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person Explanation. - For the purposes of this Chapter, - (a) "minor" means a person who, under the provisions of the Indian Majority Act, 1875 (9 of 1875) is deemed not to have attained his majority, Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 13 of 77 (b) "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not re- married. (2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses for proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's [allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made : Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing.
Explanation.- If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an [allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order. (emphasis supplied) … … … Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 14 of 77 BNS (Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita) Section 85 – Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty. Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. (emphasis supplied) Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 Order for maintenance of wives, children and parents.
144. (1) If any person having sufficient means neglects or refuses to maintain- (a) his wife, unable to maintain herself; or (b) his legitimate or illegitimate child, whether married or not, unable to maintain itself; or (c) his legitimate or illegitimate child (not being a married daughter) who has attained majority, where such child is, by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury unable to maintain itself; or (d) his father or mother, unable to maintain himself or herself, a Magistrate of the first class may, upon proof of such neglect or refusal, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, at such monthly rate as such Magistrate thinks fit and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Provided that the Magistrate may order the father of a female child referred to in clause (b) to make such allowance, until she attains her majority, if the Magistrate is satisfied that the husband of such female child, if married, is not possessed of sufficient means: Provided further that the Magistrate may, during the pendency of the proceeding regarding monthly allowance for the maintenance under this sub-section, order such person to make a monthly allowance for the interim maintenance of his wife or such child, father or mother, and the expenses of such proceeding which the Magistrate considers reasonable, and to pay the same to such person as the Magistrate may from time to time direct: Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 15 of 77 Provided also that an application for the monthly allowance for the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding under the second proviso shall, as far as possible, be disposed of within sixty days from the date of the service of notice of the application to such person. Explanation.- For the purposes of this Chapter, "wife" includes a woman who has been divorced by, or has obtained a divorce from, her husband and has not remarried. (2) Any such allowance for the maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding shall be payable from the date of the order, or, if so ordered, from the date of the application for maintenance or interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be. (3) If any person so ordered fails without sufficient cause to comply with the order, any such Magistrate may, for every breach of the order, issue a warrant for levying the amount due in the manner provided for levying fines, and may sentence such person, for the whole or any part of each month's allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, as the case may be, remaining unpaid after the execution of the warrant, to imprisonment for a term which may extend to one month or until payment if sooner made: Provided that no warrant shall be issued for the recovery of any amount due under this section unless application be made to the Court to levy such amount within a period of one year from the date on which it became due: Provided further that if such person offers to maintain his wife on condition of her living with him, and she refuses to live with him, such Magistrate may consider any grounds of refusal stated by her, and may make an order under this section notwithstanding such offer, if he is satisfied that there is just ground for so doing.
Explanation.- If a husband has contracted marriage with another woman or keeps a mistress, it shall be considered to be just ground for his wife's refusal to live with him. (4) No wife shall be entitled to receive an allowance for the maintenance or the interim maintenance and expenses of proceeding, from her husband under this section if she is living in adultery, or if, without any sufficient reason, she refuses to live with her husband, or if they are living separately by mutual consent. (5) On proof that any wife in whose favour an order has been made under this section is living in adultery, or that without sufficient reason she refuses to live with her husband, or that they are living separately by mutual consent, the Magistrate shall cancel the order.
Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 16 of 77 OUR CONSIDERATION 6. What we are now required to consider in the light of the aforenoted submissions is as to whether Section 498A IPC can be given a construction so as to include the man in a “live-in relationship”. It is quite clear that the word used in the Section is “husband”. As already observed, Mr. Nuli, wants the word to be strictly interpreted, and the Union of India agrees with him.
The respondent and Ms. Nariman, say that the word should be given a purposive interpretation. Let us then understand these two canons of statutory interpretation. STRICT INTERPRETATION OF PENAL STATUTES (a) A Constitution Bench in Commr. of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar & Co.30, which was to determine the rule of interpretation to be applied in interpreting a provision/notification for tax exemption, particularly with respect to the entitlement of the assessee and the rate of the tax to be applied, discussed the rule of strict interpretation, also referring to earlier directions in the context of penal statutes, as follows: “20.
It is well accepted that a statute must be construed according to the intention of the legislature and the courts should act upon the true intention of the legislation while applying law and while interpreting law. If a statutory provision is open to more than one meaning, the Court has to choose the interpretation which represents the intention of the legislature. .... 30 (2018) 9 SCC 1 Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 17 of 77 22.
In Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan [Kanai Lal Sur v. Paramnidhi Sadhukhan, AIR 1957 SC 907] , it was held that if the words used are capable of one construction only then it would not be open to the courts to adopt any other hypothetical construction on the ground that such construction is more consistent with the alleged object and policy of the Act.
23. In applying rule of plain meaning any hardship and inconvenience cannot be the basis to alter the meaning to the language employed by the legislation.
This is especially so in fiscal statutes and penal statutes. Nevertheless, if the plain language results in absurdity, the court is entitled to determine the meaning of the word in the context in which it is used keeping in view the legislative purpose. [Commr. v. Mathapathi Basavannewwa, (1995) 6 SCC 355] Not only that, if the plain construction leads to anomaly and absurdity, the court having regard to the hardship and consequences that flow from such a provision can even explain the true intention of the legislation.
Having observed general principles applicable to statutory interpretation, it is now time to consider rules of interpretation with respect to taxation.
24. In construing penal statutes and taxation statutes, the Court has to apply strict rule of interpretation. The penal statute which tends to deprive a person of right to life and liberty has to be given strict interpretation or else many innocents might become victims of discretionary decision- making....” … 28.
The decision of this Court in Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court [Punjab Land Development and Reclamation Corpn. Ltd. v. Labour Court, (1990) 3 SCC 682 : 1991 SCC (L&S) 71] , made the said distinction, and explained the literal rule: (SCC p. 715, para 67) “67. The literal rules of construction require the wording of the Act to be construed according to its literal and grammatical meaning, whatever the result may be.
Unless otherwise provided, the same word must normally be construed throughout the Act in the same sense, and in the case of old statutes regard must be had to its contemporary meaning if there has been no change with the passage of time.” Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 18 of 77 That strict interpretation does not encompass strict literalism into its fold. It may be relevant to note that simply juxtaposing “strict interpretation” with “literal rule” would result in ignoring an important aspect that is “apparent legislative intent”.
We are alive to the fact that there may be overlapping in some cases between the aforesaid two rules. With certainty, we can observe that, “strict interpretation” does not encompass such literalism, which lead to absurdity and go against the legislative intent. As noted above, if literalism is at the far end of the spectrum, wherein it accepts no implications or inferences, then “strict interpretation” can be implied to accept some form of essential inferences which literal rule may not accept.” (emphasis supplied) (b) Further, a Constitution Bench in Standard Chartered Bank vs.
Directorate of Enforcement31, while dealing with an issue under the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1973, extensively discussed the rule of strict interpretation by K.G. Balakrishnan, J. as he then was observed: “23. ... It is true that all penal statutes are to be strictly construed in the sense that the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included and would have been included if thought of.
All penal provisions like all other statutes are to be fairly construed according to the legislative intent as expressed in the enactment. Here, the legislative intent to prosecute corporate bodies for the offence committed by them is clear and explicit and the statute never intended to exonerate them from being prosecuted. It is sheer violence to common sense that the legislature intended to punish the corporate bodies for minor and silly offences and extended immunity of prosecution to major and grave economic crimes. 31 (2005) 4 SCC 530 Crl.
Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 19 of 77 24. The distinction between a strict construction and a more free one has disappeared in modern times and now mostly the question is “what is true construction of the statute?” A passage in Craies on Statute Law, 7th Edn. reads to the following effect: “The distinction between a strict and a liberal construction has almost disappeared with regard to all classes of statutes, so that all statutes, whether penal or not, are now construed by substantially the same rules. ‘All modern Acts are framed with regard to equitable as well as legal principles.’ ‘A hundred years ago,’ said the court in Lyons' case [Lyons v.
Lyons, 1858 Bell CC 38 : 169 ER 1158] , ‘statutes were required to be perfectly precise and resort was not had to a reasonable construction of the Act, and thereby criminals were often allowed to escape. This is not the present mode of construing Acts of Parliament. They are construed now with reference to the true meaning and real intention of the legislature.” At p. 532 of the same book, observations of Sedgwick are quoted as under: “The more correct version of the doctrine appears to be that statutes of this class are to be fairly construed and faithfully applied according to the intent of the legislature, without unwarrantable severity on the one hand or unjustifiable lenity on the other, in cases of doubt the courts inclining to mercy.”” D.M Dharmadhikari J in the same judgment said: “36.
The rule of interpretation requiring strict construction of penal statutes does not warrant a narrow and pedantic construction of a provision so as to leave loopholes for the offender to escape (see Murlidhar Meghraj Loya v. State of Maharashtra [(1976) 3 SCC 684 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 493] ). A penal statute has to also be so construed as to avoid a lacuna and to suppress mischief and to advance a remedy in the light of the rule in Heydon's case [(1584) 3 Co Rep 7a : 76 ER 637] .
A common-sense approach for solving a question of applicability of a penal statute is not ruled out by the rule of strict construction. (See State of Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 20 of 77 A.P. v. Bathu Prakasa Rao [(1976) 3 SCC 301 : 1976 SCC (Cri) 395] and also G.P. Singh on Principles of Statutory Interpretation, 9th Edn., 2004, Chapter 11, Synopsis 3 at pp. 754 to 756)”.
And, Arun Kumar J. concurring, observed: “42. So far the principle regarding strict construction of penal statutes is concerned there can be no quarrel. However, we need not misapply the principle. This principle has developed only in the context of the provisions in statutes which lay down the elements of an offence and the persons who can be charged with it. If there is any ambiguity or doubt as to whether in a given case an offence is made out or not or about who can be an offender with respect to the given offence, the ambiguity is to be resolved in favour of the person charged.
In Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes, 12th Edn., the rule is stated as under: “Strict construction of words setting out the elements of an offence.—If there is any ambiguity in the words which set out the elements of an act or omission declared to be an offence, so that it is doubtful whether the act or omission in question in the case falls within the statutory words, the ambiguity will be resolved in favour of the person charged.
This is, in practice, by far the most important instance of the strict construction of penal statutes.” ... … …” (emphasis supplied) (c) In holding that the difference of amount in the cheque subject matter of Section 138, Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 proceedings vis-à-vis the notice Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 21 of 77 sent thereunder, would not be a mere typographical error and would in fact be an error in law, the judgment in Kaveri Plastics vs.
Mahdoom Bawa Bahrudeen Noorul32, discussed strict interpretation as follows: “6. The interpretation of the words “said amount” in proviso (b) to section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, as above is based on the principle of statutory interpretation that penal statute would always be construed and applied strictly. This court in M. Narayanan Nambiar v. State of Kerala [1962 SCC OnLine SC 85; 1963 Supp (2) SCR 724; AIR 1963 SC 1116.] , spoke on the rule of construction of a penal provision in its true perspective by quoting from the English decision in Dyke v.
Elliott [[1872] LR 4 PC 184.] which was again referred to in a more recent decision of this court in Balaji Traders v. State of U.P. [2025 SCC OnLine SC 1314.] : “A decision of the Judicial Committee in Dyke v. Elliot [[1872] LR 4 PC 184.] , (1) cited by the learned counsel as an aid for construction neatly states the principle and therefore may be extracted : Lord justice James speaking (1) [1872] LR 4 PC 184, 191, for the Board observes at page 191 : ‘No doubt all penal Statutes are to be construed strictly, that is to say, the court must see that the thing charged as an offence is within the plain meaning of the words used, and must not strain the words on any notion that there has been a slip, that there has been a casus omissus, that the thing is so clearly within the mischief that it must have been intended to be included if thought of.
On the other hand, the person charged has a right to say that the thing charged although within the words, is not within the spirit of the enactment.” (emphasis supplied) 32 2025 SCC OnLine SC 2019 (Two Judge Bench) Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 22 of 77 (d) Chief Justice Marshall in United States vs. Wiltberger 33 , succinctly captured the rule under discussion as below: “7.
It is said, that notwithstanding this rule, the intention of the law maker must govern in the construction of penal, as well as other statutes. This is true. But this is not a new independent rule which subverts the old. It is a modification of the ancient maxim, and amounts to this, that though penal laws are to be construed strictly, they are not to be construed so strictly as to defeat the obvious intention of the legislature.
The maxim is not to be so applied as to narrow the words of the statute to the exclusion of cases which those words, in their ordinary acceptation, or in that sense in which the legislature has obviously used them, would comprehend. The intention of the legislature is to be collected from the words they employ. Where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The case must be a strong one indeed, which would justify a Court in departing from the plain meaning of words, especially in a penal act, in search of an intention which the words themselves did not suggest.
To determine that a case is within the intention of a statute, its language must authorise us to say so. It would be dangerous, indeed, to carry the principle, that a case which is within the reason or mischief of a statute, is within its provisions, so far as to punish a crime not enumerated in the statute, because it is of equal atrocity, or of kindred character, with those which are enumerated. If this principle has ever been recognized in expounding criminal law, it has been in cases of considerable irritation, which it would be unsafe to consider as precedents forming a general rule for other cases.” (emphasis supplied) (e) The principle that flows from reference to the above decisions is that though penal statutes are to be given strict construction, but however, in applying the same, it is necessary to ‘seek the intention of its maker’.
While doing so, it is to be kept in mind that the legislature cannot 33 1820 SCC OnLine US SC 3 Crl. Appeal No(s)......./2026 @ SLP (Crl.) No(s). 2240-2241 of 2026 Page 23 of 77 exhaustively consider all situations and circumstances where the statute may be required to be applied. It does not as such, countenance strict literalism, without paying any heed to the consequence. In fact, what we are required to consider is “what is true construction of the statute”.
MISCHIEF RULE AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION (a) The rule of purposive interpretation requires the Court, while interpreting a provision, to attach that meaning to the provision which serves the purpose that the provision is designed to achieve, which the values, goals, interests and policies that the provision furthers. This is done through the language of the statute, its legislative purpose and the judicial discretion of the Court.
The relevant para of Shailesh Dhairyawan vs. Mohan Balkrishna Lulla34 are extracted hereunder: “31. …The principle of “purposive interpretation” or “purposive construction” is based on the understanding that the court is supposed to attach that meaning to the provisions which serve the “purpose” behind such a provision. The basic approach is to ascertain what is it designed to accomplish? To put it otherwise, by interpretative process the court is supposed to realise the goal that the legal text is designed